A missing immutable root of trust in the hardware results in the ability to bypass secure boot or execute untrusted or adversarial boot code.
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A System-on-Chip (SoC) implements secure boot by verifying or authenticating signed boot code. The signing of the code is achieved by an entity that the SoC trusts. Before executing the boot code, the SoC verifies that the code or the public key with which the code has been signed has not been tampered with. The other data upon which the SoC depends are system-hardware settings in fuses such as whether "Secure Boot is enabled". These data play a crucial role in establishing a Root of Trust (RoT) to execute secure-boot flows. One of the many ways RoT is achieved is by storing the code and data in memory or fuses. This memory should be immutable, i.e., once the RoT is programmed/provisioned in memory, that memory should be locked and prevented from further programming or writes. If the memory contents (i.e., RoT) are mutable, then an adversary can modify the RoT to execute their choice of code, resulting in a compromised secure boot. Note that, for components like ROM, secure patching/update features should be supported to allow authenticated and authorized updates in the field.
8 recorded CVEs are caused by CWE-1326 (Missing Immutable Root of Trust in Hardware). The highest-severity and most recent are shown first. 0 new CWE-1326 CVEs have been recorded so far in 2026 (4 in 2025).
What can happen when CWE-1326 is exploited.
Gain Privileges or Assume Identity, Execute Unauthorized Code or Commands, Modify Memory
Affects: Authentication, Authorization
Typically introduced during these phases of the software lifecycle.
Technologies
Practical mitigations for CWE-1326, grouped by where in the lifecycle they apply.
When architecting the system, the RoT should be designated for storage in a memory that does not allow further programming/writes.
During implementation and test, the RoT memory location should be demonstrated to not allow further programming/writes.
Automated testing can verify that RoT components are immutable.
Effectiveness: High
Root of trust elements and memory should be part of architecture and design reviews.
Effectiveness: High
Illustrative examples from MITRE showing how the weakness appears in code.
The RoT is stored in memory. This memory can be modified by an adversary. For example, if an SoC implements "Secure Boot" by storing the boot code in an off-chip/on-chip flash, the contents of the flash can be modified by using a flash programmer. Similarly, if the boot code is stored in ROM (Read-Only Memory) but the public key or the hash of the public key (used to enable "Secure Boot") is stored in Flash or a memory that is susceptible to modifications or writes, the implementation is vulnerable.
The example code below is a snippet from the bootrom of the HACK@DAC'19 buggy OpenPiton SoC [REF-1348]. The contents of the bootrom are critical in implementing the hardware root of trust.
CAPEC attack patterns that exploit this weakness.
Common questions about CWE-1326.
A missing immutable root of trust in the hardware results in the ability to bypass secure boot or execute untrusted or adversarial boot code.
8 recorded CVEs are attributed to CWE-1326, including CVE-2025-2762, CVE-2024-8357, CVE-2024-32742.
When architecting the system, the RoT should be designated for storage in a memory that does not allow further programming/writes.
Automated Dynamic Analysis: Automated testing can verify that RoT components are immutable.
Exploiting CWE-1326 can lead to: Gain Privileges or Assume Identity, Execute Unauthorized Code or Commands, Modify Memory.
8 recorded CVEs are caused by CWE-1326; none are currently in CISA's KEV catalog of actively exploited flaws.
Weakness data is sourced from the MITRE CWE catalog (v4.20). CVE associations are aggregated and kept current by RadicalNotion.AI.
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