Variant weakness

Draft

CWE-129: Improper Validation of Array Index

Also known as: out-of-bounds array index, index-out-of-range, array index underflow

The product uses untrusted input when calculating or using an array index, but the product does not validate or incorrectly validates the index to ensure the index references a valid position within the array.

250

Recorded CVEs

With this primary weakness

KEVs

In the CISA KEV catalog

High

Likelihood of exploit

Per MITRE

Variant

Abstraction

MITRE classification

Overview

CWE-129 (Improper Validation of Array Index) is a variant-level software weakness catalogued by MITRE in the Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE). It describes a recurring type of mistake that can lead to exploitable security vulnerabilities.

How to prevent it

Practical mitigations for CWE-129, grouped by where in the lifecycle they apply.

Architecture and Design

Input Validation

Use an input validation framework such as Struts or the OWASP ESAPI Validation API. Note that using a framework does not automatically address all input validation problems; be mindful of weaknesses that could arise from misusing the framework itself (CWE-1173).

Architecture and Design

For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.

Even though client-side checks provide minimal benefits with respect to server-side security, they are still useful. First, they can support intrusion detection. If the server receives input that should have been rejected by the client, then it may be an indication of an attack. Second, client-side error-checking can provide helpful feedback to the user about the expectations for valid input. Third, there may be a reduction in server-side processing time for accidental input errors, although this is typically a small savings.

Requirements

Language Selection

Use a language that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.

For example, Ada allows the programmer to constrain the values of a variable and languages such as Java and Ruby will allow the programmer to handle exceptions when an out-of-bounds index is accessed.

Operation

Build and Compilation

Environment Hardening

Run or compile the software using features or extensions that randomly arrange the positions of a program's executable and libraries in memory. Because this makes the addresses unpredictable, it can prevent an attacker from reliably jumping to exploitable code.

Examples include Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) [REF-58] [REF-60] and Position-Independent Executables (PIE) [REF-64]. Imported modules may be similarly realigned if their default memory addresses conflict with other modules, in a process known as "rebasing" (for Windows) and "prelinking" (for Linux) [REF-1332] using randomly generated addresses. ASLR for libraries cannot be used in conjunction with prelink since it would require relocating the libraries at run-time, defeating the whole purpose of prelinking.

For more information on these techniques see D3-SAOR (Segment Address Offset Randomization) from D3FEND [REF-1335].

Effectiveness: Defense in Depth — These techniques do not provide a complete solution. For instance, exploits frequently use a bug that discloses memory addresses in order to maximize reliability of code execution [REF-1337]. It has also been shown that a side-channel attack can bypass ASLR [REF-1333].

Operation

Environment Hardening

Use a CPU and operating system that offers Data Execution Protection (using hardware NX or XD bits) or the equivalent techniques that simulate this feature in software, such as PaX [REF-60] [REF-61]. These techniques ensure that any instruction executed is exclusively at a memory address that is part of the code segment.

For more information on these techniques see D3-PSEP (Process Segment Execution Prevention) from D3FEND [REF-1336].

Effectiveness: Defense in Depth — This is not a complete solution, since buffer overflows could be used to overwrite nearby variables to modify the software's state in dangerous ways. In addition, it cannot be used in cases in which self-modifying code is required. Finally, an attack could still cause a denial of service, since the typical response is to exit the application.

Implementation

Input Validation

Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.

When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."

Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.

When accessing a user-controlled array index, use a stringent range of values that are within the target array. Make sure that you do not allow negative values to be used. That is, verify the minimum as well as the maximum of the range of acceptable values.

Implementation

Be especially careful to validate all input when invoking code that crosses language boundaries, such as from an interpreted language to native code. This could create an unexpected interaction between the language boundaries. Ensure that you are not violating any of the expectations of the language with which you are interfacing. For example, even though Java may not be susceptible to buffer overflows, providing a large argument in a call to native code might trigger an overflow.

Architecture and Design

Operation

Environment Hardening

Run your code using the lowest privileges that are required to accomplish the necessary tasks [REF-76]. If possible, create isolated accounts with limited privileges that are only used for a single task. That way, a successful attack will not immediately give the attacker access to the rest of the software or its environment. For example, database applications rarely need to run as the database administrator, especially in day-to-day operations.

Architecture and Design

Operation

Sandbox or Jail

Run the code in a "jail" or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict which files can be accessed in a particular directory or which commands can be executed by the software.

OS-level examples include the Unix chroot jail, AppArmor, and SELinux. In general, managed code may provide some protection. For example, java.io.FilePermission in the Java SecurityManager allows the software to specify restrictions on file operations.

This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of the application may still be subject to compromise.

Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.

Effectiveness: Limited — The effectiveness of this mitigation depends on the prevention capabilities of the specific sandbox or jail being used and might only help to reduce the scope of an attack, such as restricting the attacker to certain system calls or limiting the portion of the file system that can be accessed.

Code examples

Illustrative examples from MITRE showing how the weakness appears in code.

In the code snippet below, an untrusted integer value is used to reference an object in an array.

Vulnerable example

java

public String getValue(int index) {

If index is outside of the range of the array, this may result in an ArrayIndexOutOfBounds Exception being raised.

The following example takes a user-supplied value to allocate an array of objects and then operates on the array.

Vulnerable example

java

private void buildList ( int untrustedListSize ){

This example attempts to build a list from a user-specified value, and even checks to ensure a non-negative value is supplied. If, however, a 0 value is provided, the code will build an array of size 0 and then try to store a new Widget in the first location, causing an exception to be thrown.

In the following code, the method retrieves a value from an array at a specific array index location that is given as an input parameter to the method

Vulnerable example

int getValueFromArray(int *array, int len, int index) {

However, this method only verifies that the given array index is less than the maximum length of the array but does not check for the minimum value (CWE-839). This will allow a negative value to be accepted as the input array index, which will result in reading data before the beginning of the buffer (CWE-127) and may allow access to sensitive memory. The input array index should be checked to verify that is within the maximum and minimum range required for the array (CWE-129). In this example the if statement should be modified to include a minimum range check, as shown below.

The following example retrieves the sizes of messages for a pop3 mail server. The message sizes are retrieved from a socket that returns in a buffer the message number and the message size, the message number (num) and size (size) are extracted from the buffer and the message size is placed into an array using the message number for the array index.

Vulnerable example

/* capture the sizes of all messages */

Safe example

/* capture the sizes of all messages */

In this example the message number retrieved from the buffer could be a value that is outside the allowable range of indices for the array and could possibly be a negative number. Without proper validation of the value to be used for the array index an array overflow could occur and could potentially lead to unauthorized access to memory addresses and system crashes. The value of the array index should be validated to ensure that it is within the allowable range of indices for the array as in the following code.

In the following example the method displayProductSummary is called from a Web service servlet to retrieve product summary information for display to the user. The servlet obtains the integer value of the product number from the user and passes it to the displayProductSummary method. The displayProductSummary method passes the integer value of the product number to the getProductSummary method which obtains the product summary from the array object containing the project summaries using the integer value of the product number as the array index.

Vulnerable example

java

// Method called from servlet to obtain product information

Safe example

java

// Method called from servlet to obtain product information

Safe example

java

ArrayList productArray = new ArrayList(MAX_PRODUCTS);

The following example asks a user for an offset into an array to select an item.

The programmer allows the user to specify which element in the list to select, however an attacker can provide an out-of-bounds offset, resulting in a buffer over-read (CWE-126).

CWE-129: Improper Validation of Array Index

Overview

Real-world CVEs

Common consequences

How it happens

When it is introduced

Applies to

How to prevent it

How to detect it

Automated Static Analysis

Automated Dynamic Analysis

Automated Dynamic Analysis

Black Box

Code examples

Illustrative examples

Terminology & mappings

Alternate terms

Mapped taxonomies

Attack patterns

Frequently asked questions

What is CWE-129?

What CVEs are caused by CWE-129?

How do you prevent CWE-129?

How is CWE-129 detected?

What are the consequences of CWE-129?

Is CWE-129 actively exploited?

References

Stay ahead of CWE-129

Overview

Real-world CVEs

Common consequences

How it happens

When it is introduced

Applies to

How to prevent it

How to detect it

Automated Static Analysis

Automated Dynamic Analysis

Automated Dynamic Analysis

Black Box

Code examples

Illustrative examples

Related weaknesses

Parent

Can precede

Terminology & mappings

Alternate terms

Mapped taxonomies

Attack patterns

Frequently asked questions

What is CWE-129?

What CVEs are caused by CWE-129?

How do you prevent CWE-129?

How is CWE-129 detected?

What are the consequences of CWE-129?

Is CWE-129 actively exploited?

References

Stay ahead of CWE-129