---
title: "CWE-1244: Internal Asset Exposed to Unsafe Debug Access Level or State"
url: https://radicalnotion.ai/cwe/cwe-1244
type: cwe
description: "The product uses physical debug or test interfaces with support for multiple access levels, but it assigns the wrong debug access level to an internal asset, providing unintended access to the asset from untrusted debug agents."
updated: 2026-11-10
source: RadicalNotion.AI
license: CC BY-NC 4.0 (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/)
---

# CWE-1244: Internal Asset Exposed to Unsafe Debug Access Level or State

- **Abstraction:** Base
- **Structure:** Simple
- **Status:** Stable
- **CVEs with this as primary weakness:** 12
- **Of those, in CISA KEV:** 0
- **New in 2026:** 2
- **CWE catalog version:** 4.21

## Description

The product uses physical debug or test interfaces with support for multiple access levels, but it assigns the wrong debug access level to an internal asset, providing unintended access to the asset from untrusted debug agents.

## Background

Debug authorization can have multiple levels of access, defined such that different system internal assets are accessible based on the current authorized debug level. Other than debugger authentication (e.g., using passwords or challenges), the authorization can also be based on the system state or boot stage. For example, full system debug access might only be allowed early in boot after a system reset to ensure that previous session data is not accessible to the authenticated debugger.

## Modes of introduction

| Phase | Note |
| --- | --- |
| Architecture and Design | - |
| Implementation | - |

## Applicable platforms

**Technologies:** System on Chip (Undetermined)

## Common consequences

| Scope | Impact | Note |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Confidentiality | Read Memory | If a protection mechanism does not ensure that internal assets have the correct debug access level during each boot stage or change in system state, an attacker could obtain sensitive information from the internal asset using a debugger. |
| Integrity | Modify Memory | - |
| Authorization, Access Control | Gain Privileges or Assume Identity, Bypass Protection Mechanism | - |

## Potential mitigations

### Architecture and Design, Implementation

For security-sensitive assets accessible over debug/test interfaces, only allow trusted agents.

Effectiveness: High

### Architecture and Design

Apply blinding \[REF-1219\] or masking techniques in strategic areas.

Effectiveness: Limited

### Implementation

Add shielding or tamper-resistant protections to the device, which increases the difficulty and cost for accessing debug/test interfaces.

Effectiveness: Limited

## Detection methods

### Manual Analysis

Check 2 devices for their passcode to authenticate access to JTAG/debugging ports. If the passcodes are missing or the same, update the design to fix and retest. Check communications over JTAG/debugging ports for encryption. If the communications are not encrypted, fix the design and retest.

Effectiveness: Moderate

## Demonstrative examples

### Example 1

The JTAG interface is used to perform debugging and provide CPU core access for developers. JTAG-access protection is implemented as part of the JTAG\_SHIELD bit in the hw\_digctl\_ctrl register. This register has no default value at power up and is set only after the system boots from ROM and control is transferred to the user software.

Bad code:

```other
1 bit  0x0 = JTAG debugger is enabled (default)
JTAG_SHIELD  0x1 = JTAG debugger is disabled
```

Informative code:

```
The default value of this register bit should be set to 1 to prevent the JTAG from being enabled at system reset.
```

This means that since the end user has access to JTAG at system reset and during ROM code execution before control is transferred to user software, a JTAG user can modify the boot flow and subsequently disclose all CPU information, including data-encryption keys.

### Example 2

The example code below is taken from the CVA6 processor core of the HACK@DAC'21 buggy OpenPiton SoC. Debug access allows users to access internal hardware registers that are otherwise not exposed for user access or restricted access through access control protocols. Hence, requests to enter debug mode are checked and authorized only if the processor has sufficient privileges. In addition, debug accesses are also locked behind password checkers. Thus, the processor enters debug mode only when the privilege level requirement is met, and the correct debug password is provided.

Bad code:

```systemverilog
module csr_regfile #(
...
    // check that we actually want to enter debug depending on the privilege level we are currently in
    unique case (priv_lvl_o)
        riscv::PRIV_LVL_M: begin
            debug_mode_d = dcsr_q.ebreakm;
...
        riscv::PRIV_LVL_U: begin
            debug_mode_d = dcsr_q.ebreaku;
...
    assign priv_lvl_o = (debug_mode_q || umode_i) ?  riscv::PRIV_LVL_M : priv_lvl_q;
...
    debug_mode_q  <= debug_mode_d;
...
```

Good code:

```systemverilog
module csr_regfile #(
...
    // check that we actually want to enter debug depending on the privilege level we are currently in
    unique case (priv_lvl_o)
        riscv::PRIV_LVL_M: begin
            debug_mode_d = dcsr_q.ebreakm;
...
        riscv::PRIV_LVL_U: begin
            debug_mode_d = dcsr_q.ebreaku;
...
    assign priv_lvl_o = (debug_mode_q && umode_i) ? riscv::PRIV_LVL_M : priv_lvl_q;
...
    debug_mode_q  <= debug_mode_d;
...
```

## Observed examples

| CVE | Description |
| --- | --- |
| CVE-2019-18827 | After ROM code execution, JTAG access is disabled. But before the ROM code is executed, JTAG access is possible, allowing a user full system access. This allows a user to modify the boot flow and successfully bypass the secure-boot process. |

## Real CVEs with this weakness

| CVE | Title | Severity | CVSS | EPSS | CISA KEV | Published |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| CVE-2020-5372 | - | high | 8.6 | - | No | 2020-07-06 |
| CVE-2025-42878 | Sensitive Data Exposure in SAP Web Dispatcher and Internet Communication Manager (ICM) | high | 8.2 | - | No | 2025-12-09 |
| CVE-2024-0114 | - | high | 8.1 | - | No | 2025-03-05 |
| CVE-2026-29642 | - | high | 7.8 | - | No | 2026-04-20 |
| CVE-2025-23252 | - | high | 7.5 | - | No | 2025-06-18 |
| CVE-2025-23337 | - | medium | 6.7 | - | No | 2025-09-17 |
| CVE-2022-32259 | The system images for installation or update of the affected application contain unit test scripts with sensitive information. An attacker could gain information about testing architecture and also tamper with test configuration. | medium | 6.5 | - | No | 2022-06-14 |
| CVE-2025-67862 | - | medium | 6.0 | - | No | 2026-06-09 |
| CVE-2025-20238 | Cisco Secure Firewall Adaptive Security Appliance and Secure Firewall Threat Defense Software Authenticated Command Injection Vulnerabilities | medium | 6.0 | - | No | 2025-08-14 |
| CVE-2025-23302 | - | medium | 4.2 | - | No | 2025-09-04 |
| CVE-2025-23301 | - | medium | 4.2 | - | No | 2025-09-04 |
| CVE-2025-36755 | CleverDisplay BlueOne unauthorized BIOS access through physical USB keyboard | low | 2.4 | - | No | 2025-12-12 |

## Related attack patterns (CAPEC)

- [CAPEC-114](https://radicalnotion.ai/capec/capec-114): Authentication Abuse

## Related weaknesses

| Relationship | CWE | Name |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Parent | [CWE-863](https://radicalnotion.ai/cwe/cwe-863) | Incorrect Authorization |

## Frequently asked questions

### What is CWE-1244?

The product uses physical debug or test interfaces with support for multiple access levels, but it assigns the wrong debug access level to an internal asset, providing unintended access to the asset from untrusted debug agents.

### What CVEs are caused by CWE-1244?

12 recorded CVEs are attributed to CWE-1244, including CVE-2020-5372, CVE-2025-42878 and CVE-2024-0114.

### How do you prevent CWE-1244?

For security-sensitive assets accessible over debug/test interfaces, only allow trusted agents.

### How is CWE-1244 detected?

Manual Analysis: Check 2 devices for their passcode to authenticate access to JTAG/debugging ports. If the passcodes are missing or the same, update the design to fix and retest. Check communications over JTAG/debugging ports for encryption. If the communications are not encrypted, fix the design and retest.

### What are the consequences of CWE-1244?

Exploiting CWE-1244 can lead to: Read Memory, Modify Memory, Gain Privileges or Assume Identity, Bypass Protection Mechanism.

### Is CWE-1244 actively exploited?

12 recorded CVEs are caused by CWE-1244; none are currently in CISA's KEV catalog of actively exploited flaws.

Primary source: [MITRE CWE](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/1244.html)

---

Source: [RadicalNotion.AI](https://radicalnotion.ai/cwe/cwe-1244). Licensed CC BY-NC 4.0; attribute RadicalNotion.AI and link the source page when you reuse this data.
